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HOW ISLAMISM IMPERILS THE WESTERN LIBERAL ORDER

by

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Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Beeker entered the Air Force in 1996 as a graduate of the United States Air Force Academy. He also received a Masters of Cyberwarfare from the Air Force Institute of Technology in 2009. Lt. Col. Beeker is a command pilot primarily flying the A/OA-10 Warthog. Additionally, he flew the F/A-18 on exchange with the United States Navy at NAS Fallon, NV where he also trained Navy Special Warfare personnel to become Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs). Lt. Col. Beeker also served as the Chief of Combat Targets Division at U.S. Cyber Command and the Director of Operations of the 549th Combat Training Squadron at Nellis AFB, NV facilitating the Green Flag exercise. Most recently, Lt Col. Beeker was the commander of the 549th Range Squadron at Avon Park, FL preparing air and land forces for combat operations. Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Beeker is currently assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL.

Abstract

Islamism is a modern convention. The Islamist movement threatens the modern liberal order because Islamism compels the modern liberal order to resort to naked force or abject surrender. Addressing the threat of Islamism requires a moderate approach, which upon recognizing the limitations of man, rejects a mechanistic foreign policy and relies upon an organic approach.

Liberalism wrestles with the internal tensions in its understanding of man and nature as it confronts the challenges of a different conception in Islam. The Islamist goes a step further as he antagonizes the tensions in liberalism until the liberalist either must fight back conceding his identity or concede the liberal project to which he is committed. The liberal state cannot actually tolerate those who would submit to an authority above the state. The goals of the liberal state with regard to assimilating Muslims is actually in contravention to the goals of globalization since the liberal state seeks to break the ties and authority of any external sovereign. The liberal state will resort to force to assure compliance.

Globalization has failed to assimilate peoples into the western liberal order, in part because it takes an overly mechanized approach to people. Islamism stresses the liberal state and its institutions. Instead of surrendering to the forces of globalization, some states are rejecting liberalism outright.

Islamism has been growing and working its way into Muslim societies for a hundred years; Liberal nations will not easily uproot or eradicate Islamist ideology. A pragmatic approach to the conflict in worldviews that does not abandon liberal principle, but shapes what the environment offers will yield the truest result in the liberal conflict with Islamism.



Introduction

In its most idealistic moments, the United States views itself as a type of city on a hill, a beacon of hope for the world to emulate. In this vein, American liberal democracy is the example for individual freedom and universal human rights. The progressive mind sees the march of time consummated in peaceful community through the means of liberal democracy. It is the impulse of man to establish community, not just within the borders of the state, but universally across the globe. Following the devastation of WWII, this impulse in the United States resulted in the reordering of relationships between peoples through international organizations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Though always impossible to achieve, the impulse for a peaceful order is natural.

This impulse, this desire, to establish unity and cohesion from the particular state to the international order is common to man. While the liberal democracy desires to achieve a world community, the impulse to achieve world community is no different for the Muslim world. Though the desire is the same, the world community each desires is at odds with one another. Juxtaposed with liberalism, Islamism proffers an alternative view of authority, power sharing, and the means to establish the ideal of world community. Because liberal democracy and Islamism are incompatible, the United States will increasingly find itself in opposition and conflict with Islamists. The United States must chart a course that is neither overconfident in human nature, nor too pessimistic. As philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr noted in 1960, “Both moral sensibility in politics and moral pessimism encourage totalitarian regimes, the one because it encourages the opinion that it is not necessary to check the power of government, and the second because it believes that only absolute political authority can restrain the anarchy, created by conflicting and competitive interests.”¹ In the conflict with the totalitarian ideology of

Islamism, the United States must understand the nature of its own view of ordering the world as well as that of Islamism, soberly considering how strategy will engage the adversary and practically enable the ideals of the liberal democratic order. In this conflict, United States leadership cannot abandon its principles to practicalities, yet at times, those principles seem to present weakness where there should be strength. The Islamist movement threatens the modern liberal order because Islamism compels the modern liberal order to resort to naked force or abject surrender. Managing between these extremes, the road ahead requires humility, dignity, wise use of self-interest and beguilement to preserve security and promote liberal values.



Thesis

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The Nature of the Islamist Movement

Defining Islamism

Islam is a highly flexible and adaptable religion. One can pair the idea of the religion of Islam with a host of ideologies and concepts. Islamic Modernism², Islamic Calvinism³, and Islamic fundamentalism are but examples of the flexibility inherent in describing Islam. This flexibility comes at the cost of confusion. Particularly when considering differing cultural or historical viewpoints, we desire clarity. What do we mean by the term Islamism or Islamist? Since 1697, many authors, including Voltaire and Tocqueville for example, used the term Islamism to refer primarily to the religion of Islam.⁴ However, this generalized meaning does not connote the present day sense of Islamism or an Islamist.

In the Muslim world, authors have largely used the terminology of the Qur'an to describe Muslims, even when they are describing the concept of a more political form of the religion. In Arabic, the term Muslim is *Muslim* (singular masculine), *Muslima* (singular feminine), *Muslimûn* (plural masculine) or *Muslimât* (plural feminine).⁵ "The Muslim equivalent to Islamists is *Islamiyyûn*."⁶ *Islamiyyûn* is a term never used in the Qur'an; therefore, the majority of Muslim thinkers and authors favor the terms *Muslimûn* along with *Mu'minûn* meaning Believers.⁷ Leaders in the political Islamic movement such as Hasan al-Banna used the term for 'Muslim' or 'Muslim Brothers' hence the naming of the group he founded. The use of the terms for all Muslims tends to conflate a sense of universality about the concepts of political Islamism with the community of Muslims writ large. While a few Muslim authors use the term *Islamiyyûn*,⁸ the lack of precision in the definition leads to confusion. How much more confused are non-Arabic speakers when trying to ascertain what is meant by Islamism and its relationship to the wider Muslim community.

Westerners almost never used the term Islamism until the 1979 Islamist revolution in Iran.⁹ The introduction of a brand of Islam as preached by the Ayatollah Khomeini introduced the rest of the world to something that used the flexibility of Islam to generate a host of terms such as ‘Islamic radicalism’ or ‘Islamic fundamentalism’.¹⁰ The events of 9/11 forced another reassessment of terms. Since that time Western journalists, politicians and authors have increased their use of the term ‘Islamism’ aspiring for greater conceptual clarity.¹¹ In the present day, Muslim authorities who want to describe their opposition to these groups label Islamists as *Irhâbiyyûn*, Terrorists, or *Mutatarrifûn*, meaning Extremists.¹² Certainly, the west uses a host of terms, including terrorists; however, lumping the threat of these groups under the umbrella of terrorism conceals the real identity of the threat from totalitarian Islamism.¹³ Mehdi Mozaffari’s definition of Islamism as “a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world by all means” articulates the concept.¹⁴ Labeling Islamism a religious ideology, does not discount its political and social aspects, for it is also a protest movement.¹⁵ A consensus is emerging around the term Islamism in both western and Muslim circles. Islamism is a totalitarian worldview or ideology on par with Nazism, Marxism-Leninism or communism.¹⁶

The Modern Liberal Order

Progressive Liberalism

“In a sense all of America is liberalism,” wrote Arthur Schlesinger Jr in 1962.¹⁷ Liberalism is a complex set of traditions, not a unified doctrine,¹⁸ thus creating challenges to characterize what is included or excluded under the umbrella of liberalism. The ideas of social liberalism and progressivism characterize modern Liberalism.¹⁹ Theodore Roosevelt’s New Nationalism, Woodrow Wilson’s New Freedom, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal

represent the ideals of Progressive Liberalism.²⁰ As Arthur Schlesinger points out, “liberalism in the American usage has little in common with the word as used in the politics of any European country, save possibly Britain,” as such it is better associated with the concept of social liberalism.²¹

In both Europe and the United States, the ideas of modern liberalism stem from a Kantian view of humankind and the role of government. Enlightenment thinking in general moves to throw off the bonds of tyranny and ignorance imposed by the monarchical state and the church. It finds in the universality of human reason the ability to discover moral laws thus creating a state where equal and free people cast moral judgments because of reason.²² The theme of progressive liberalism is that free, rational people have the power to become better and are moving towards an enlightened and perfected state. Kant wrote, “The course of human affairs as a whole does not begin with good and then proceed to evil, but develops gradually from the worse to the better, and each individual is for his own part called upon by nature to contribute towards this progress to the best of his ability.”²³

Political scientist Peter O’Brien argues in his book *The Muslim Question in Europe*, that “the most politically consequential ideological clashes in Europe are those between the public philosophies of liberalism (all should enjoy equal rights and freedoms), nationalism (the rights and needs of natives should have priority over non-natives) and postmodernism (what passes for right and wrong is always the result of political contestation).”²⁴ One of O’Brien’s major assertions is that this combination of ideological clashes creates a “messy” political environment and messy approach to policies concerning Muslims across Europe.²⁵ By messy he indicates that policies are at times “highly contradictory” if not “self-defeating”.²⁶ O’Brien also argues that even in liberalism there are competing impulses for how to handle issues surrounding Muslims.

O'Brien further divides Liberalism into Liberal Voluntarism and Liberal Perfectionism.²⁷ Classical and Modern Liberalism are alternative labels. The difference is in how much government intervention is required to achieve liberalism's ends. Liberal Voluntarism serves as a pole on one end advocating for freedom from government intervention for the individual while Liberal Perfectionism represents an alternative pole whereby government intervention helps a person make the right choices in order to become a "person capable of genuine self-mastery."²⁸

Liberalism not only champions but also depends on liberty, equality, rationality, and progress for its legitimization. Because it claims to be a self-legislated morality, liberalism requires persons who are granted liberty and equality to act rationally and progressively. Essentially, it needs persons neither to prevent nor to endanger their own freedom or that of anyone else. If they do either, they cast doubt on the very universality of human reason on which liberalism morally rests.²⁹

The tensions between both voluntarism and perfectionism reveal themselves over important issues regarding how liberal democracies will treat Muslims. Issues as major as immigration and citizenship, or fighting terrorism, and as minor as the practice of veiling create controversy. Because Islamism endangers Liberal freedom, Islamism endangers the moral certitude of the universality of human reason.

Immigration policy, for example, reveals the strain between voluntarism and perfectionism. The voluntarist promotes what O'Brien calls a "thin" conception of citizenship translating into "advocacy for cosmopolitanism and liberal multiculturalism."³⁰ Here the liberal state should protect the individual's right to self-associate with any group since this identity is part of the individual's autonomy. Liberal multiculturalism argues that the state cannot tell the individual what language to speak, what religion to pursue, what groups to join, or what God to serve.³¹ Gerard Delanty in *Cosmopolitan Imagination: The Renewal of Social Critical Theory*

argues for the idea that citizenship rights need decoupling from territorial lines and ethnicities, correlating instead citizenship with personhood not peoplehood.³²

If voluntarism represents a thin conception of citizenship best described by cosmopolitanism and liberal multiculturalism, then perfectionism composes itself by a thick conception labeled liberal assimilationism by O'Brien.³³ Here, the state requires the assimilation of immigrants to a generally agreed to formulation of the state's moral principles, typically described by the state's constitution, and at least in the West, a commitment to liberal democratic principles.³⁴ In effect, the immigrant must conform and adopt the liberal outlook of the state despite personal beliefs to the contrary, and if they do not they must be compelled. Jürgen Habermas, a German sociologist and philosopher, wrote

The constitutional state confronts its citizens with the demanding expectations of an ethics of citizenship that reaches beyond mere obedience to the law. Religious citizens and communities must not only superficially adjust to the constitutional order. They are expected to appropriate the secular legitimisation of constitutional principles under the very premises of their own faith.³⁵

The variance in the approach to citizenship reveals the tensions liberalism faces with regard to interacting with the Muslim world. Liberalism wrestles with the internal tensions in its understanding of man and nature as it confronts the challenges of a different conception in Islam. The Islamist goes a step further as he antagonizes the tensions in liberalism until the liberalist either must fight back conceding his identity or concede the liberal project to which he is committed.

The Threat

Islamism as anachronistic

ISIS shocked the western liberal world when they declared a Caliphate. Turning back the hands of time and progress to the 7th century leaves western liberals scratching their heads.³⁶ For the liberal, progress moves forward to establish a peaceful world community, not backwards to a time of slavery and harsh jurisprudence. ISIS actions tempt modern liberals to view the threat of Islamism anachronistically, thus discounting the severity and true modernity of global Salafism. This view is a mistake. Discounting the threat posed by al Qaeda and ISIS preserves operating space for these organizations. Islamism is not an anachronistic, backwards looking, political or religious movement; Islamism is a thoroughly modern conception with a vision for the future.

Prior to 1924, the year the Turkish National Assembly dissolved the Caliphate, there was less sense of or need for Islamism. Individuals existed within the political structure and community established through the religion of Islam. The end of the Caliphate, having endured for nearly 14 centuries in one form or another, expedited the search for alternative ideologies and political structures in the Muslim world. In 1928, Egyptian schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood, “the mother of all Islamist movements.”³⁷ Al-Banna hoped to blend the pre-modern and modern, East and West into a new structure for Muslims.³⁸

Brookings Institution scholar Shadi Hamid, himself a Muslim, makes the argument that Islam is exceptional, neither good nor bad, simply different.³⁹ Understanding that “Islam ... is distinctive in how it relates to politics ... has profound implications for the future of the Middle East and, by extension, for the world in which we all live.”⁴⁰ Because Islam is different, Islam’s relationship with the state will be different. First, Hamid argues that we cannot expect the relationship between Islam and politics to replicate the Western model as found in the

reformation. Christianity and Islam are different; those that call for Islamic reformation remain naïve. The progressive liberal sees all history marching in the same direction. To demand or anticipate that Islam follow the path of Western history- the Protestant Reformation, followed by an enlightenment, succeeded by secularism- misunderstands the nature of Islam.⁴¹

The Islamist Reformation

In fact, some might argue that the Salafists represent the Islamic reformation.⁴² The Salafist movement that spawned the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 has its roots in the 18th century Wahhabism from Saudi Arabia. “All Salafists take a fundamentalist approach to Islam, emulating the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers—*al-salaf al-salih*, the “pious forefathers”—right down to their facial hair. They reject religious innovation, or *bida*, and support the implementation of *sharia* (Islamic law).”⁴³ Generally, the modern instantiation of Salafism divides into the Quietist, Political, and Jihadi branches.

The Quietist branch, or purists, advocate for silence on political matters believing that politics undercuts the sovereignty of God. Quietists do not typically engage in political activities, but they do engage in political discourse across a variety of topics.⁴⁴ They can however be motivated into political action. The Arab Spring brought hundreds of thousands of Quietist Salafis to participate in parliamentary elections across the Middle East. The humanitarian crisis in Syria has pushed Quietists to move from a pacifist role and take up arms in the Syrian crisis.⁴⁵ Further, Quietist Salafis in Kuwait debate how to protect their brethren and whether to spend more for orphans of the Syrian crisis or funnel money into fighters.⁴⁶ Writing on the existential threat posed by Al Qaeda and ISIS, Drs. Kimberly and Fredrick Kagan note, “The phenomenon of Quietist Salafis becoming Salafi-jihadis-or at least their financiers- as a result of the appalling humanitarian crisis and seemingly existential threat to Sunni populations

in Syria and elsewhere is a manifestation of the way in which the regional sectarian war is mobilizing the Muslim community behind radical and violent solutions more broadly.”⁴⁷

The second group of Salafists are the political or activist group. For these believers, the goal is to establish “a true Muslim state through imposition of the Sharia, which they viewed not only as the strict Quranic law but also the practices of the salaf.”⁴⁸ The Muslim Brotherhood is representative of these political-Salafis. These political groups hold to a belief that “the unity of Islam as an all-encompassing guide for the life of the believer in his or her community.”⁴⁹ Throughout their history, these political groups have “supported some degree of violence to pursue their aims.”⁵⁰ Although groups like the Muslim Brotherhood have renounced violence in the past, recent events make the Brotherhood question the tactics and strategy of establishing an Islamic state. In Egypt, the unlikely revolution, followed by the rise of Mohamed Morsi only to be ousted in a military coup and then have their members massacred in Rabaa has served to push more moderate political elements closer to the jihadis.⁵¹ If there was a lesson for all political-Salafis from the tragedies in Egypt, then it is to consolidate power if they ever get to share it again, brutally if necessary. A lesson not lost on President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, as he has purged the leadership and military of his country following a coup attempt. Erdogan’s administration has jailed or dismissed over 10,000 members of the military, including over half of the top Generals and Admirals. If this were the U.S. military, it would be as if the president dismissed or jailed one in sixty uniformed members.⁵² Political-Salafis do not appear to pose an immediate threat to the West, at least when they do not advocate for violence or support more radical elements. However, like the Quietists, they can and do provide financial support to jihadis; moreover, they also provide cover and community for jihadis.⁵³ Ultimately, the

Political-Salafis vision of community and the path for the future conflicts with the nation-state system and the future envisioned by liberals.

The final division of Salafis is the Jihadi branch. Westerners are quite familiar with extremist groups such as al Qaeda, its Syrian instantiation in Jaysh al Islam, ISIS, or the branch of intolerant adherents founded in Saudi Arabia known as Wahhabis. The Salafist-jihadi takes as a personal obligation, *fard 'ayn*, the idea that armed conflict against unbelievers and apostates is required by Islam.⁵⁴ In fact, failure to perform *fard 'ayn* imperils the soul. The Salafi-jihadi is the most dangerous, finding cause to kill civilians, including other Muslims in some circumstances.⁵⁵

Salafi-jihadists will not be content to keep their efforts localized. For them it is a matter of establishing the end of an Islamic community over all the Earth. According to Dr. Mary Habeck, Associate Professor in Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), for the jihadi, “Islam is a liberation theology, determined to free men from oppression by other men and return God to His rightful place as the sole legislator.”⁵⁶ Jihadis reject the compromises that other Islamic scholars have made with western ideas of secularism and modernity and have no respect for the division of religious and political life. A Cold War style containment strategy is insufficient. Strategy built on containing jihadi efforts in the Middle East is naïve and does not reflect recent history nor the fervency of jihadi ideology that prioritizes attacking and dismantling the West. The jihadi envisions a world not only free of secularism and modernity, but as al-Banna stated, “[we] will pursue this evil force to its own lands, invade its Western heartland and struggle to overcome it until all the world shouts by the name of the Prophet and the teachings of Islam spread throughout the world. Only then will

Muslims achieve their fundamental goal, and there will be no more 'persecution' and all religion will be exclusively for Allah.”⁵⁷

Jihadis do not recognize national boundaries of states and work to abolish them. This is one reason that the ISIS propaganda machine puts out videos on their efforts to reverse the Sykes-Picot Agreement publicizing their bulldozing of the sand berm that once delineated Syria from Iraq.⁵⁸ It is true that Salafi-jihadism will not appeal to as many Muslims as the political or quietist movements; however, “if the Islamic State has proved anything, it is that a relatively small number of ideologically committed individuals can have an outsized effect on the regional and international order and perhaps even the course of history.”⁵⁹ To build a strategy against Islamist groups such as ISIS, one must first understand the nature of its ideology of Islamism.

Ideology of the Islamist with attention to ISIS

“All systems of thought are structurally the same” according to Dr. Nancy Pearcey, professor at Houston Baptist University. “Each starts by proposing something as ultimate reality, then seeks to explain the world on that basis—spinning out the implications, garnering empirical support, and so on.”⁶⁰ Although drawing deeply from Islam as the source, Islamism represents a unique strain of thought in its own right. For the Islamist, the origin of this worldview rests with the combination of Islamic thought with the material realization of state as established by the Prophet Muhammed in Medina after he arrived in Medina in 622 A.D.

The creation for Islamism occurs in the 7th century at Medina. Pakistani theologian Abu Alâ Mawdudi, one of a number of contemporary Islamist leaders, wrote in his work *Islam Today* that “the first Muslims were a ‘small but devoted group of courageous and selfless people’, who succeeded in creating a city state in which the Islamic principles ‘no longer remained mere theoretical expressions, they became a living reality in individual and social life’. The Medina

model is the ‘Ideal period’”⁶¹ According to their interpretation of Islam, this period of time leads to the establishment of the Caliphate for the Islamist and reflects the creation of the Islamic state by Muhammad and his immediate successors. According to their interpretation of Islamic texts, life in the Caliphate creates a wholeness to life that lasts for eternity and should exist over the entire earth. “The holism is based on the absolute indivisibility of the trinity *Dîn* [Religion], *Dunya* [Way of life] and *Dawla* [Government].”⁶² The stark reality is that the world does not conform to the Islamist views.

The world’s problem is that it does not conform to the Islamist’ view of the trinity of existence. Highlighting the fall of Islamism, the political power of Islam has receded in the modern era. For example, Palestine, Kashmir, or Chechnya represent areas once, but no longer, under the control of Islamic governments.⁶³ Not only is the world not right because the Caliphate does not reign supreme, the world, particularly the western powers, actively repress the Islamic world according to this view. Modern Islamism emerges as a product of the history of colonization and the challenges of industrialization and modernization. Where once Marxism beckoned and called to oppose the west, “Islamism has . . . become the final resort to seek redemption in a world vacated by Marxism (at least temporarily).”⁶⁴ Even further, the Islamist is repressed because “Muslims live under severe repression from their own (anti-Islamic) governments.”⁶⁵ If the world is fallen, what will restore it according to the Islamist?

For the Islamist, Islam is a universal religion whose goal is to rule over the entire world.⁶⁶ The first step to achieving this utopia is the reestablishment of the Caliphate.⁶⁷ Islamist groups approach the struggle to establish the Caliphate from a variety of positions as outlined above. Some seek only peaceful indoctrination or political struggle, while others will use a variety of violent means. While some Islamist groups adopt a pacifistic approach, the use of violence and

in particular terrorism, has proven integral to working towards the restoration of the world. In fact, an Islamist group like ISIS is preoccupied with the end times and sees the struggle in Manichean terms of good versus evil. Further, “The Islamic State differs from nearly every other current jihadist movement in believing that it is written into God’s script as a central character.”⁶⁸ Appreciation of ISIS’s narrative reveals the importance placed on actually governing land in a physical Caliphate. Just as with all Islamist movements, one should not view ISIS as a political entity divorced from religion, for ISIS also represents a vehicle for salvation. According to Musa Cerantonio, a man identified by ISIS as one of the two most important spiritual authorities guiding foreigners to join the Islamic State, “the Muslim who acknowledges one omnipotent god and prays, but who dies without pledging himself to a valid caliph and incurring the obligations of that oath, has failed to live a fully Islamic life.”⁶⁹ When the interviewer, Graeme Wood, pointed out that this would condemn the vast majority of Muslims throughout history, not to mention all those who died between 1924 and 2014, Cerantonio responded, “I would go so far as to say that Islam has been reestablished” by the Caliphate.”⁷⁰

Certainly, ISIS does not represent the views of a majority of Sunni Muslims; however, Islamism is an inclusive ideology that attracts adherents from around the globe. Like Communism, Islamism has demonstrated the potential to grow and take root in the politics of developing nations. Like Communism, Islamism is antithetical with western liberal democracy. Like communism, Islamism threatens the traditional order led by the United States. The greatest resonance of the Islamist narrative strikes a chord in predominately-Muslim countries. This last fact challenges liberal ideals of toleration. A stark choice seems to face the liberal: the condemnation of all Muslims because some might be swayed by Jihadi extremism, or tolerating all Muslims even if some are Islamists willing to resort to extremism to achieve their ends.

Naked Force or Abject Surrender

Introduction

The Islamist movement threatens the modern liberal order because Islamism compels the modern liberal order to resort to naked force or abject surrender.

The Liberal state cannot actually tolerate those who would submit to an authority above the state. The goals of the liberal state with regard to assimilating Muslims is actually in contravention to the goals of globalization since the liberal state seeks to break the ties and authority of any external sovereign. The liberal state will resort to force to assure compliance.

Globalization has failed to assimilate peoples into the western liberal order, in part because it takes an overly mechanized approach to people seeing one as good as another for the labor pool. Islamism stresses the liberal state and its institutions. Instead of surrendering to the forces of globalization, some states are rejecting liberalism outright.

Finally, liberalism promotes a peaceful world. Paradoxically, liberalism must resort to war in order to achieve its peace. Liberalism promotes higher intensity conflict by promoting war as purification of a people or by devaluing its enemies.

Locke and Tolerance

There is distinction between the role of the church and the role of government in American liberal democracy derived in part from the philosophy of John Locke. This distinction makes it difficult for Americans to conceive of a state where religion and state authority overlap or are shared. As one explores the origins of the American liberal democracy in greater depth, they see the incongruities of the Islamist system with liberal democracy with greater clarity.

John Perry's work, *The Pretenses of Loyalty: Locke, Liberal Theory, and American Political Theology*, helps us to understand that Locke is a man who changed positions on tolerance over the course of his life and writings. Locke started out with a more Hobbesian view advocating that the sovereign merely needed to impose a religious confession.⁷¹ Locke's views shifted in time and he recognized that toleration was actually helpful to build social peace and order. Second, Locke observed, "the coercive imposition of confessional uniformity, was itself unworkable, precisely because individuals' commitments were deeper and more entrenched than he had previously thought."⁷² The dilemma for the modern liberal state is how far they must support toleration before alternative visions subsume the nature of society. Locke elucidated the boundaries of toleration for his day.

In *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, Locke specifically excludes two types of people based upon their rejection of the authority of the state. "That Church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is constituted upon such a bottom that all those who enter into it do thereby ipso facto deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince."⁷³ By this logic, Locke excluded both Catholics and Muslims from the protection of religious toleration. At the time of writing, this made logical sense. The individual Muslim's allegiance was not to the state of citizenship but bound to the Mufti of Constantinople, who was himself subject to the Ottoman Emperor, creating obvious conflict.⁷⁴ Equally, in the Protestant mind, the Catholic who obeys the pope over the state authorities is subject to the same suspicion and the state cannot afford him toleration. At the time, the Pope could, and did, excommunicate heads of state and encouraged the state's Catholic citizens to overthrow the authorities in place.⁷⁵ Drawing the parallel to today's Islamists who call on "true" believers of Islam to reject the

governments of the Middle East and overthrow the world order, liberal democracy cannot tolerate such a religion and survive.

Finding Locke in NSC-68

The authors of NSC-68, America's strategy for opposing Communism during the Cold War, wrote, "The free society values the individual as an end in himself, requiring of him only that measure of self-discipline and self-restraint which make the rights of each individual compatible with the rights of every other individual."⁷⁶ Implied is that the individual will restrain themselves from using their freedom to impose their beliefs on others. Yet when those individuals band together in a Church, and seek to impose their religion over others they go too far. Authorities violate an individual's right of conscience more easily when the religious law and the state law are the same. This is the conundrum of Sharia law and the mode of governance espoused by the Islamist. NSC-68 goes on to say:

From this idea of freedom with responsibility derives the marvelous diversity, the deep tolerance, the lawfulness of the free society. This is the explanation of the strength of free men. It constitutes the integrity and the vitality of a free and democratic system. The free society attempts to create and maintain an environment in which every individual has the opportunity to realize his creative powers. It also explains why the free society tolerates those within it who would use their freedom to destroy it.⁷⁷

The deep tolerance of American society is a strength. The writers of NSC-68 are expressing a voluntarist perspective of liberalism when they argue that free society can tolerate those who would destroy the society because in the end, persons guided by reason will see the strength and universality of liberalism. However, free society cannot in fact tolerate those within it who would use their freedom to destroy it. This is a fundamental understanding of American Lockean liberalism. The liberal state cannot withstand certain types of behavior that threaten the

state or threaten the church. The over-tolerant voluntarist state finds itself surrendering to those who oppose it.

While the rhetoric of the west is voluntarist, arguing that everyone is free to live as they desire, no state, liberal or not, can sustain the freedom of people who seek to destroy the authority in place. Consider the present reality of how Middle Eastern governments treat Islamists. These states regularly jail members of the Muslim Brotherhood or keep them from public office. The United States goes to great lengths to kill or imprison members of al Qaeda and ISIS. The reality is that the U.S. does not tolerate Islamists who it views as those who would destroy democracy any more than it could tolerate communists who sought to overthrow the world order during the Cold War. As French political scientist and philosopher Pierre Manent has pointed out, “For European countries . . . the question of Islam is a question of high and great politics because it is a question at once of the internal and the external, of domestic politics and foreign affairs.”⁷⁸ This truth is equally applicable to the United States. The threat posed by Islamism forces America to go well beyond developing plans to destroy ISIS or fight al Qaeda overseas. Just as in 1950 when the United States formulated a strategy to confront Communism, so too the threat of Islamism demands an assessment of the strengths and limitations of liberal democracy as well as an evaluation of the terms of tolerance for Muslims in Western society.

The Miscalculations of Globalization

Globalization is the manifestation of the imagined global society transcending the nation-state boundary.⁷⁹ Globalization has the greatest recent influence upon the security of Europe because globalization has enabled the mass migration of individuals threatening the culture and national identity of European States. Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations* envisions globalization’s

rise where an increase of trade and industry across the globe correspondingly alleviates want and suffering.⁸⁰ Smith's economic work is itself an extension of Kantian Utopianism and related to the progressive liberal's vision for the future. The dawning light of globalization has brought benefit to some; however, globalization has not led to complete human flourishing or matched the Kantian vision of human progress. Moreover, as people contemplate the dark side of globalization and its inability or unwillingness to live up to its aspirations, they choose one of two courses of action.

They may choose a countervailing approach that relies not upon globalism, but upon rebellion or revolution to push towards society's collectivist goals.⁸¹ The other option is to withdraw and retrench to a nationalistic or realistic approach to human interaction and exchange attempting to find a modest unity secured in the nation-state or through group identification.⁸² Because man is finite, the attempts to bring about world community through globalization, or even revolution and rebellion are doomed to fail. Europe struggles with the impacts of globalization upon the identity and culture of the people and state. This struggle manifests in the traditional aspects of trade- the flow of capital and goods. However, the real wake-up call for European security and identity comes with the less talked about third part of "free trade"- labor.⁸³

In modern globalization, labor is free to travel without regard to traditional borders. Herman E. Daly, professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland and a former World Bank economist notes, "Globalization refers to the global economic integration of many formerly national economies into one global economy, mainly by free trade and free capital mobility, but also by somewhat easier or uncontrolled migration. It is the effective erasure of national boundaries for economic purposes. What was international becomes interregional."⁸⁴

For the economist, labor is simply labor. Individual identity is unimportant, as one person is as good as another is if they can perform the same tasks and skills for production, or consumption. As Noam Chomsky, Institute Professor Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology noted in his book *Understanding Power*, “Capitalism basically wants people to be interchangeable cogs, and differences among them, such as on the basis of race, usually are not functional.”⁸⁵ In a globalized system, race or ethnicity, religion or culture are meaningless.

Take for example one of the incongruities regarding the migrant crisis unfolding in Europe. For Central Europeans the promise of capitalism and globalism was supposed to bring something brighter than the dark repressive system they just left. Economic development and reforms in former communist bloc countries like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia pushed these nations to the EU and the west. One would think that Central Europeans, having escaped the bonds of Communism only decades ago, would be welcoming to new immigrants, particularly those escaping harsh regimes. As a people restricted by fences and walls only a couple decades ago observers might expect them to embrace breaking down national boundaries and barriers to travel. What then explains the rejection of migrants, and the turn to populism and increasingly illiberal governments in these nations?

Ivan Krastev, chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, argues, “Of the many crises that Europe faces today, it is the migration crisis that most sharply defines the changing nature of European politics.”⁸⁶ People are simply not cogs in the global machine producing and consuming goods. They actual come with religious, national and ethnic identities. According to the United Nations, “the number of international migrants worldwide has continued to grow rapidly over the past fifteen years reaching 244 million in 2015, up from 222 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000.”⁸⁷ Where globalization failed to include many poor countries

from its benefits, people have voted with their feet to chase its benefits down.⁸⁸ As of 2015, nearly two thirds of all international migrants (76 million) now live in Europe.⁸⁹ Faced with the prospect of tens of thousands of migrants and refugees⁹⁰ crossing their borders monthly if not daily in some cases, the Central European nations reacted reflexively to defend their sovereignty and identity. Hungary has started on its second wall to keep migrants out of the country.⁹¹ Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán publically declared his goal to create an illiberal democracy, in part due to the threats imposed on the Hungarian people by globalization and precipitated by the refugee crisis. Orbán stated in a speech in 2014 that "We are searching for (and we are doing our best to find, ways of parting with Western European dogmas, making ourselves independent from them) the form of organizing a community, that is capable of making us competitive in this great world-race."⁹² This example of the popular revolt against globalism is present across the region. Though strange sounding to American ears, Orbán's populist appeal to preserve Hungarian culture and identity separate from the pressures of a liberal democratic order modeled in the utopian idealism of the European Union gives voice to a quite explainable phenomenon.

The turn to populism and illiberalism are consistent with the cultural and historic experiences of Central Europeans. Set at the crossroads of powerful competing empires, a tragic history shaped the nature Central Europeans. Once the empires that held the peoples of these regions together disintegrated in the fires of WWI and WWII, forced removal and ethnic cleansing solidified the character and national identity of these states. At one time countries like Hungary or Poland were diverse multiethnic societies. Today, Poland sits, at 98% homogeneity- a feat achieved by killing or removing the Germanic, Ukrainian or Jewish peoples during and after the World Wars.⁹³ The destruction of these peoples led to the growth of the middle class in

Central Europe when the displaced people's homes and businesses were confiscated.⁹⁴ Central Europeans look warily at the return to ethnic diversity caused by mass migration as it reminds them of the troubling interwar periods and would serve to erase what cost so much blood to achieve.⁹⁵ Only a few thousand of the current migrants and asylum seekers have sought permanent residency in Central Europe, and of these, the Central European nations have accepted a small handful of applicants.⁹⁶ In response to the European Union's proposed mandatory plan to redistribute refugees, Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán stated defiantly, "Brussels can't tell us who we should live with"; no one in Brussels should have the power to settle people in the country "with whom we have no desire to coexist."⁹⁷

“*Wir schaffen das*” (We can do it) was the rallying cry during the migration crisis for Germany's Prime Minister, Angela Merkel, the progenitor of the redistribution plan. Muslims are not the only ones who bring their culture to the table. Germans voters maintain cultural and national identities. Merkel's “We can do it” statement meant that Germany expected to assimilate a million refugees a year into their society. The voluntarist liberal says, “We can do it;” the pragmatist pays 3 billion a year to Turkey to hold Muslim immigrants there and prevent them from coming into Europe.⁹⁸ Virulent opposition to her open door policy and loss of voter support drove Chancellor Merkel to drop her slogan and face the reality of a polity that fundamentally disagrees with her liberalist approach.⁹⁹

The irony for European cosmopolitans and globalization idealists is that the dream of a borderless Europe, finally achieved through Schengen, created a security hole through which hundreds of thousands of migrants streamed into and across Europe. While the revolt against freely flowing capital and goods simmered under the surface, Schengen could not survive the reality of what freely flowing people meant. The reality is that people are not cogs, but bring

identity with them. The peoples of Europe feel their historic, national and cultural identities are under attack. As such, the migration crisis focused the governments of Europe causing some, such as the Hungarians, to reject the premises and promises of globalization, heed the call of populism and strengthen national identity, even at the cost of liberal democracy.

Countering Terrorism as a Liberalist

While the recent wave of Muslim migrants and asylum seekers in Europe stresses the liberal ideals of Europe, one must recognize that very few of these migrants are Islamists. However, Islamism creates tension beyond the difficulty of assimilating hundreds of thousands of culturally different people. Islamists use the diaspora for cover and recruitment. Terror attacks in Brussels, Paris or London perpetrated by Islamist groups attempt to provoke a heavy-handed approach towards Muslim asylum seekers. One goal of terrorism is to delegitimize the government in the eyes of the people and a second is to make the people identify with the rebellious cause. By provoking an oppressive response, one possible course for liberalism, European governments reinforce the goals of Islamists.

The response of liberal governments to countering terrorism reveals the dichotomy between Liberal Voluntarism and Liberal Perfectionism. Voluntarism incorporates a cosmopolitan multicultural approach to countering terrorism whereas Perfectionism insists or compels Muslims to adopt a liberal approach in order to counter terrorism.¹⁰⁰ The multicultural approach argues that the free practice of religion should in fact foster among Muslims a greater tolerance and respect for non-Muslims.¹⁰¹ Because Europe has a different relationship with the church and actually spends state money on the church, the argument has been to treat Islam the same as Christianity and provide state funds to the mosques.¹⁰² In his book, *The Emancipation of*

Europe's Muslims: The State's Role in Minority Integration, political scientist Jonathan Laurence argues that the European states have used the establishment of “Islam councils” to try to free Muslims from foreign influence but also exert control over them. The rhetoric is all voluntarism, invoking the language of freedom and encouraging moderate voices within the Muslim community.¹⁰³ As a counter-terror strategy, the voluntarist government approach seems to reflect reality. Nearly all the councils across Europe condemned the 9/11 attacks and subsequent terrorist acts.¹⁰⁴ The Muslim Council of Britain came out condemning the most recent terrorist attack in March 2017 in London, as well as the 7/7 attacks in Britain in 2005.¹⁰⁵ These European Muslim council condemnations correlate to the condemnations made by international Muslim Brotherhood movement leader Jusuf al-Qaradawi when he condemned the 9/11 attacks and issued a *fatwa* denouncing Al Qaeda’s “illegal jihad.”¹⁰⁶ While critics lambast these assertions of support as disingenuous, particularly from Islamists, the voluntarist spirit lives on as long as Muslims “observe the rule of law in democracies and abstain from committing or facilitating terrorist acts.”¹⁰⁷ If the voluntarist is right then Muslims will, like all humans, travel down a path of increasing enlightenment that grows in its election of universal liberal ideals.

Olivier Roy, one of the world’s recognized experts on political Islam, argues an essentially voluntarist position regarding the prevention of Islamist extremism when he writes:

It is, in fact, participation in the political process that leads believers with little inclination toward democracy as a social ideal to accept the rules of the game and often to become strong defenders of those rules. If we had to wait for everyone to become a democrat before creating democracy, France would still be a monarchy.¹⁰⁸

Roy’s theory, labeled the “Islamization of radicalism” posits that young followers of Islam are essentially in “generational revolt” with their parents. They are already radicalized individuals who express their radicalization through the religion of Islam, but not because Islam

radicalizes them.¹⁰⁹ These young Muslims “find in Islam the best way to express, experience, and to live their rejection of society.”¹¹⁰ This theory stands in opposition to the idea of “the radicalization of Islam through the spread of Salafist ideas” proposed by many other scholars.¹¹¹

Of course, the liberal voluntarist government that supports a mosque or an Islam council with state dollars is subject to perfectionist action. As Jonathan Laurence points out, “European Muslims are experiencing the throes of a distilled and abbreviated era of emancipation: a dual movement of expanding religious liberty and increasing control exerted over religion.”¹¹² European states are not only using the Islam councils to settle issues such as education or halal food in order to incorporate Muslims into the European structure, they use their funding of these councils to compel adherence to a liberal standard.¹¹³ European officials tell Islamic organizations what constitutes “proper counter-terrorism preaching and practice.”¹¹⁴ The French and Spanish have issued guidance for training imams in how to promote democracy and avert a turn to extremism in their congregants.¹¹⁵ Germany and Austria issued a joint instruction to Muslim clerics telling them how to preach counter terrorism in the prison system.¹¹⁶ Reflecting the perfectionist position, German Interior Minister Schäuble said in May 2006:

The number of Islamists is not the same thing as the number of potential terrorists, but Islamists have a vision of state order that we do not share....We do not want terrorists, but we also do not want Islamists. Instead, we want [Muslims to have a] passion for this country....We must insist that Muslims in Germany identify with the constitution.¹¹⁷

Exercising control over their Islam councils and Muslim leaders serves two purposes: The liberal European states desire to separate European Muslims from direct foreign oversight and separate European Muslims from the influence of transnational Islamist movements.¹¹⁸ Gilles Kepel, a French political scientist specializing in the study of the Islamic and Arabic world, laid out the

challenge for the European state as one of integrating Muslims into the globalizing world.

Following the terrorist attacks in Madrid, Kepel stated in an interview:

The future of Islam is in Europe. It has a huge Muslim population. Either we train our Muslims to become modern global citizens, who live in a democratic, pluralistic society, or, on the contrary, the Islamists win, and take over those Muslim European constituencies. Then we're in serious trouble.¹¹⁹

Clearly repudiating Kepel's assertion and the goals of globalization, Laurence argues that the goal of the modern state is to integrate Muslims by creating nationally focused citizens with fewer global connections.¹²⁰ As Syrian born, now German political scientist Bassam Tibi proclaims, "A choice must be made by Muslims between Qutb and Kant, or, in the case of Europe, between a Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam- that is, the Islamization of Europe or the Europe-anization of Islam."¹²¹

Adapting Islam via Social Contract

Assuming that scholar Shadi Hamid is correct, and Islam is exceptional, the fundamental question is what should a liberal state do about those who do not and cannot share the religious and political assumptions posited by Locke and so fundamental to the structure of the liberal democracy? Again, Islam is a highly adaptable religion. Many Muslims can forgo a requirement to blend religion and political authority. However, as a proposition, the government advocated by Islamists certainly does not fit within the constraints proposed by Locke. How then would Locke resolve the dilemma posed by Muslims in liberal democracy? Perhaps, Locke in his younger years would advocate for an "oath of loyalty" that renounces those offending elements of the Islamic faith and expresses loyalty to the state.¹²² While 17th Century Europeans might have understood the oath of loyalty, it seems unlikely that moderns could appreciate such a convention. However, that does not mean that the modern state will not attempt loyalty oaths.

Peter O'Brien, consolidating a thought from Diane Sainsbury's book *Welfare States and Immigrant Rights* notes that "Denmark goes so far as to compel naturalizing immigrants (not, however, Nordics) to swear an oath to teach their children to reject terrorism."¹²³

A social contract takes place between the authorities and citizens of a state. Perhaps there is a social contract for Muslims that agrees to reject the authority of religion or the Caliphate over that of the government? This is part of French Philosopher Pierre Manent's argument in his recent book *Beyond Radical Secularism: How France and the Christian West Should respond to the Islamic Challenge*.

Manent makes a perfectionist argument when he asserts that Muslims living in France must become French-Muslims. He also notes that that France must be prepared to accept Muslims as Muslims. France, for her part must accept that society will change. There are simply too many Muslims living in France now (7.5% of the population at 4.7 Million people in 2010).¹²⁴ Despite her pretending to be a "secular country", France is in reality a "country of a Christian mark."¹²⁵ In the same way that a coin is marked or stamped with an image, so too the country of France. This Christian mark gives strength and dignity to the state. This mark also gives form to the state. "The more that the nation is able to conserve its form, the more the Republic will be able to guarantee the equality of rights," according to Manent.¹²⁶

In Manent's thinking, Muslims must find their place in a Christian country, but not accept a "subordinate position."¹²⁷ Muslims may participate as French citizens in the benefits of society without discrimination, but they must understand that they are entering a space in political and social life that is already full.¹²⁸ "Those who are accepted must want to participate actively in the life of a political body that does not and will not belong to the *umma*; they must therefore accept a degree of separation from the *umma*."¹²⁹ Manent argues that France must adapt and

find room for the Muslim faith and for Muslim cultural practices, accepting for instance the *hijab* in public and official places. He suggests that local governments can accommodate Muslims with single-sex swimming at public pools and create Muslim prayer spaces.¹³⁰ Toleration has its limits according to Manent. Manent rejects polygamy and the veiling of the face by women. Face veiling, he argues first is not tolerable because it affects only women and “thus constitutes an inequality.” Second, the veiling of the face cuts people off from recognition and from society.¹³¹ In order for the Muslim to live in France, they must accept a social contract that rejects in part what they may believe it means to be Muslim. France would in effect be offering Muslims the opportunity to “form a distinct community within a larger community that is not Muslim and that everybody knows is not Muslim.” What it cannot tolerate, according to Manent, is a minority people “wishing secretly to rule.”¹³² While many Muslims may be willing to subjugate or abandon their religious beliefs, it seems unlikely that all Muslims would be willing to reject aspects of their religion that they regard as a matter of conscience any more than a Christian could. Ideally, the Christian might answer, “We must obey God, rather than man.” By stating thus, the Christian is willing to bear the consequences of disobeying the governmental authority. Optimistically, many Muslims in Europe will adapt themselves to European norms of civility, tolerance and religious freedom; however, the alternative is not like ideal Christianity’s submission to authority but anchored in authority’s submission to Islam.

Fouad Ajami’s professor of Middle Eastern Studies at Stanford and a Shiite Muslim describes a “new geography of Islam” in Europe.”¹³³ He points out that the Muslims who fled their countries owe no allegiance to their new states and that radicals in their midst all but “savor the space afforded them by Western society.”¹³⁴ Western liberalism has not dulled or coopted this radical faith but in the lands of unbelief, the *bilad al kufr*, “the faith became sharpened for

battle.”¹³⁵ According to academic George Weigel, based upon demographic trend lines and the intensification of Islamic radicalization as a result of its contact with Western European secularism, the by-product might very well be a reversal of Polish King Jan III Sobieski’s victory at Vienna in 1683 where Muslims invaders were forced to retreat out of Central Europe. Weigel writes, “The Europe of the twenty-second century, or even the late twenty-first, is a Europe increasingly influenced and perhaps even dominated, by militant Islamic populations, convinced that their long-delayed triumph in the European heartland is at hand.”¹³⁶

Peace at all costs

A world ordered on liberal theory is a peaceful world. Enlightened people, interconnected through globalized commerce rationally have little to war over since their interdependence makes war illogical. The outcome should be the growth of liberal democracies that give way to universal values. The tradition of pacifism runs concurrently with the milieu of enlightenment ideals. David A. Bell, historian at Princeton University, uses the time of the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars in his work *The First Total War*, to demonstrate the shift that enlightenment thinking brought to warfare. His argument is that warfare shifted from a normal occurrence fought by the aristocracy for limited goals and with limited means to the all-out conception of total warfare. Bell traces enlightenment thinking regarding war to identify two main emphases. First, when the concept of warfare shifts from the ordinary to the exception, the justification for warfare on moral grounds becomes absolute. Second, Bell identifies that the dark side of the pacifist movement is the idea that war purifies humanity.

To the first point, Bell interacts with the ideas of Carl Schmitt, an influential legal theorist who remains controversial for his association with Nazism. Carl Schmitt theorized that

“absolute enmity”, whereby each side in a conflict demonizes the other and denies the other’s humanity leads to wars of annihilation and destruction.¹³⁷ The irony is that the pacifist thinking of the enlightenment actually leads not away from conflict but to larger, more destructive conflicts because it takes war out of the ordinary course of human interaction to the exceptional.

Philosopher, abbé de Saint-Pierre, published his most important work in 1713, *A Project for making Peace Perpetual in Europe*.¹³⁸ That book, while not widely read, attracted attention from Rousseau and Kant and serves as one of the progenitors of the United Nations.¹³⁹ This important work laid out detailed plans for a federation, presciently labeled, “The European Union.” Somewhat ironically, one of the reasons that Saint-Pierre argued for peace in Europe was to bring about a grand crusade against the Turks. Fast-forward 300 years, the unifying agenda of the European Union still struggles with incorporating Muslims into its ideal state. Despite the achievement of relative peace in the liberal democracies of the European Union, the liberal democracies still must face the reality that not everyone is actually moving towards liberalism. Islamism contests the pacifist vision of the future, highlighting the fact that some people are not moving towards liberalism. Nevertheless, the statistics prove that conflict is decreasing across the globe.¹⁴⁰ Does this decrease not represent the triumph of liberalism and refute the argument that Islamism poses an existential threat to Europe or anywhere else for that matter?

The claim that war is decreasing, if not ending, is tantalizing. Historically, just as in modern times, others have predicted the end of war. Joseph Cornish predicted the end of war in 1784.¹⁴¹ As Bell points out, a graph of combat deaths in 1790 would not have been a good predictor of the future of European combat; neither would a graph produced in 1913.¹⁴² A lack of combat deaths today is no predictor of tomorrow. Bell argues that because war as a human

endeavor is not steady, nor predictable, those that point out a trend in the decline in war since the end of the Cold War make unsubstantiatable pronouncements on the demise of all war.

If the world is not actually getting more peaceful, or some people are not becoming more liberal as human reason should dictate, how can the pacifist liberal overcome this challenge? For liberalism does not truly desire to lead to its own demise through abject surrender. Herein lies one of the problems for enlightenment thinkers, how to enforce their peaceful vision of the future. Published in *The Daily News* on August 14, 1914, H.G. Wells famously wrote regarding the First World War in his article, “The War That Will End War:”

This is already the vastest war in history. It is a war not of nations, but of mankind. It is a war to exorcise a world-madness and end an age... For this is now a war for peace. It aims straight at disarmament. It aims at a settlement that shall stop this sort of thing for ever. Every soldier who fights against Germany now is a crusader against war. This, the greatest of all wars, is not just another war—it is the last war!¹⁴³

Liberalism, paradoxically in the name of peace, always needs just one more war, to achieve its ends.¹⁴⁴ In the pursuit of peace, liberalism must oppose with force that which would seek its demise; otherwise, the result truly would be abject surrender.

Second, David Bell identifies the idea that the dark twin of the pacifist movement is the vision that war itself is a redemptive and desirable exception.¹⁴⁵ Bell traces the thought here that war is somehow purifying,¹⁴⁶ traversing in thought the use of Charles Darwin to justify the survival of the fittest and the use of war as a mechanism for social evolution.¹⁴⁷ In the years leading up to World War I, Bell points out that a group of artists known as the Futurists proclaimed, “war is the only hygiene of the world . . . we want to glorify war, the only cure for the world.”¹⁴⁸ Even in the modern era, this idea that war has a purifying effect persists in public rhetoric. In 2006, contemplating the nature of the current US conflict, President George Bush philosophically highlighted the concept of absolute enmity as he describes the actions on Flight

93 as the first counter attack in World War III.¹⁴⁹ President Bush also expressed the purifying nature of war for those engaged. "War is terrible," President Bush states, "But it, war brings out, you know, in some ways it touches the core of Americans who volunteer to go in to combat to protect their, their souls."¹⁵⁰

In great irony, liberal thought, while professing the rhetoric of peace, has a long tradition of glorifying or justifying war. Increasingly western liberal governments turn to surveillance, police actions, and their militaries to fight against Islamist groups. The actions of the liberal state bear witness to a hostile policy towards Islamism. The liberal states hope to destroy Islamist groups in the Middle East so that these groups do not export terrorism abroad. In this way, it would seem that liberalism is at odds with its rhetoric of universal peace and the enlightenment of individuals. The reality is that liberalism satisfies its need to sustain itself through intellectual justification of just one more war, by devaluing their opposition, or by positing that war has a purifying effect on the nation and its participants.

Recommendations

Strategy to oppose or overcome ISIS or Islamism must look both inwardly and outwardly. Strategy must understand the human impulse to extend universal community and the weakness of this impulse to achieve its goal. Reinhold Niebuhr, American philosopher and theologian wrote in 1944, "The task of building a world community is man's final necessity and possibility, but also his final impossibility."¹⁵¹ This frustrating conundrum will stymie the liberal agenda. Francis Fukuyama's declaration of the end of history in the 1990's looks premature today as the liberal capitalistic democratic order unravels. It is not that Fukuyama, or liberal thought is completely wrong, merely hope cannot actuate itself into reality. "Instead, the failures

of capitalism have turned democracy against liberalism.”¹⁵² There is no collusion between Russia, China, Iran and the Islamist threats of al Qaeda and ISIS, but there is opportunity for these opponents of the liberal order. According to Dr. Kagan, “The activities of ISIS and al Qaeda interact with the policies of Russia, Iran, and China to endanger the international systems upon which American safety and freedom depend.”¹⁵³ As the liberal agenda in Europe and America disintegrates under the stresses of mass migration, weakened fiscal policy and Russian, Chinese and Iranian subversion, the temptation is two-fold- to resort to sentimentality or to resort to despair.¹⁵⁴ The strategist swings upon a pendulum of emotion, which, as Niebuhr points out, trusts “too much in human power in one moment” or upon discovering the limits of human power loses “all faith in the meaning of life.”¹⁵⁵

The necessity of the liberal West is to recognize, with humility, the limitations of their own advancement of world community. Islamists recognize more clearly the deficiencies of the liberal system with its focus on materialism and happiness. The West must recognize these deficiencies as well as the limitations of power to coerce without giving up hope in the idealism of the liberal order. NSC-68 stated “. . . in relations between nations, the prime reliance of the free society is on the strength and appeal of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all societies into conformity with it.” The voluntarist ideal of the free society perhaps swept the writers of NSC-68 away from the moorings of realism. For no sooner did writers argue that America would be merely a light to freedom then the perfectionist desire to compel other nations to this freedom overtook the liberal mindset. Realism must temper the strength of Western idealism. Realism however cannot give way to cynicism. “The world community must be built by men and nations sufficiently mature and robust to understand that political justice is achieved, not merely by destroying, but also by deflecting, beguiling and harnessing residual

self-interest and by finding the greatest possible concurrence between self-interest and the general welfare.”¹⁵⁶

At the start of the Cold War, the west was faced with a similar, albeit, different threat to the liberal western order. George Kennan, one of the architects of Cold War strategy, noted that policy makers needed to tackle disparate challenges not simply with single policies, but with regard to encompassing end states.¹⁵⁷ Much like today, the United States faced separate “planes of international reality” upon which it had to compete.¹⁵⁸ The first plane Kennan saw was “a sane and rational one, in which we felt comfortable, in which we were surrounded by people to whom we were accustomed and on whose reactions we could at least depend.”¹⁵⁹ The second plane was “a nightmarish one, where we were like a hunted beast, oblivious of everything but survival, straining every nerve and muscle in the effort to remain alive.”¹⁶⁰ Kennan believed that when operating in the first plane, our traditional morality applied, noting, “We could still be guided . . . by the American dream.” However, in the second “there was only the law of the jungle; and we had to do violence to our own traditional principles- or many of us felt we did- to fit ourselves for the relentless struggle.”¹⁶¹ This is where western liberals find themselves today. US policy knows how to interact with those who think similarly and adopt a secular liberal outlook and agenda. The second plane disrupts policy makers causing them to feel they must abandon their liberal principles in order to face a totalitarian ideology. Can western liberals harmonize the two planes into a “coherent relationship” with one another?¹⁶²

For George Kennan the answer lies in the metaphor of the gardener. He said, “We must be gardeners and not mechanics in our approach to world affairs.”¹⁶³ Inherent in this approach is a rejection of a mechanistic view of humanity that replaces one person with another in the globalized society. Kennan’s biographer Lewis Gaddis synthesizes the thought, “International life

[is] an organic process, not a static system.”¹⁶⁴ Though western liberals might prefer certain standards of behavior, they must take the world as it is, and persuade the systems to work for them by “influencing the environmental stimuli to which they are subjected.”¹⁶⁵ According to Kennan, states implement this approach:

gently and patiently, with understanding and sympathy, not trying to force growth by mechanical means, not tearing the plants up by the roots when they fail to behave as we wish them to. The forces of nature will generally be on the side of him who understands them best and respects them most scrupulously.

Strategy cannot abandon the premise, the idealism, of the liberal democratic experiment. By its very nature, Islamism opposes the nation-state system, it conceives of itself in terms of a universal community that transcends national identity. “‘A Muslim has no nationality except his belief,’ wrote an intellectual godfather of radical Islamism, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, who was executed by Nasser in 1966.”¹⁶⁶ Here westerners must backtrack from some aspects of globalization and reinforce the power and authority of the state.

Strategy centralized around the core concept of preserving and strengthening western institutions and norms, such as Constitutional liberal democracy, universal values, respect for the rule of law favors the West. However, true actualization of the ideal means conceding some benefits of the system. The United States must be shrewd when conceding its national identity and authority to the international system, particularly with regard to security. This core value forces tough decisions. For example, what is the more important norm, the promotion of a system, which embraces globalization and the individual’s freedom to travel, versus the need to control borders and maintain security by curtailing an individual’s travels? The Islamist can take advantage of the freedom afforded in the ideal of the globalized system. Liberal nations need to pursue a counter-globalization strategy to break the foreign ties of the Muslims in their

nations and to make these people first citizens of the liberal state. Creating new liberal citizenry is a process requiring both perfectionist and voluntarist approaches. Though these two approaches conflict with one another, and at times countermand one another, both are necessary to grow a liberal citizenry. It is in the messiness of a pluralistic liberal democratic system that one constituency corrects the overreach of the other. As Kennan noted, “Nothing could be more shortsighted ‘than to sacrifice the traditional values of our civilization to our fears rather than to defend those values with our faith.’”¹⁶⁷

Strategy focused on maintaining the international system implies a degree of tolerance for local or regional Islamism; otherwise, the United States would find itself in the position of attacking Islamism all over the globe simultaneously. Strategy must recognize the limitations of man to achieve an outcome, and in this case, remember the impossibility of establishing a liberal democratic order universally. U.S. strategy should not abandon the isolation of Islamism as a viable worldview. Even today, there are still Communists and Nazis, but as a whole, these are discredited ideologies incapable of massing power to threaten the liberal order. If the metaphor is that of the gardener, then the western world has to take a grounded and realistic look at who has been tending the garden for the last 100 years.

One of the Muslim Brotherhood’s more controversial ideas is the “politics of stages” or *siyasat al-marahil*.¹⁶⁸ The Brotherhood is interested in more than just revolution or control of governments; it is interested in the reform of society.¹⁶⁹ As this transformation of society is their goal, they take a long view on its eventual accomplishment. The Brotherhood has invested and gardened the ground in Muslim society for a long time in the hope that they might achieve their ultimate objectives. This work will not be undone overnight; meanwhile, Islamists continue to

till the land and plant their seeds of ideology in opposition to the liberal West. Liberals must remain patient and accept setbacks in due course.

ISIS, in its location in Iraq and Syria, is a centralized hub in the battle against Islamism. However, ISIS, or those affiliating themselves with ISIS, have expanded to a number of countries outside the bounds of the physical “Caliphate.” Each localized instantiation of ISIS has its own unique grievances and issues that motivate violence. The United States cannot approach Islamism, or ISIS even, from an over simplistic strategic perspective. The United States must consider each threat, each country, individually. Yet, like Cold War strategy, the wholeness of strategy must emphasize the United States’ unique view on what the world may become.



Conclusion

According to Reinhold Niebuhr, “The world community, standing thus as the final possibility and impossibility of human life, will be in actuality the perpetual problem as well as the constant fulfillment of human hopes.”¹⁷⁰ The Islamist has a different contention on the nature of creating the world community, which stands in contravention to the liberal perspective. The Islamist movement threatens the modern liberal order because Islamism compels the modern liberal order to resort to naked force or abject surrender. Liberalism is always tempted to implement its agenda through force or violence, but in doing so, it risks abandoning its values. Liberalism always needs just one last war to establish perpetual peace. As Peter O’Brien notes, “Because it champions liberty but does so with absolute moral certitude, liberalism will always harbor a built-in tension between voluntarism and perfectionism.”¹⁷¹ Islamism seeks to exploit this tension and highlights the differences in voluntarist and perfectionist modes of liberalism, whether the issue is headscarves, citizenship or security.

Because people actually retain unique cultural, religious, ethnic and nationalistic identities, treating people in a mechanistic way threatens the foundations of the liberal nation-state. Simple adherence to a voluntarist position leaves the liberal state with no alternative other than abject surrender to external forces. Liberalism cannot implement through globalization its agenda for world community, because this globalization weakens the state to such a degree it cannot withstand alternative totalitarian ideologies. The result is that in response to the immigration crisis in Europe, European states find that they must deglobalize the incoming migrants in order to create stronger bonds of loyalty to the state. Though the liberal order can never ultimately prevail universally, the liberal order does have unique strengths with which to oppose the totalitarian ideology of Islamism. Liberal states must reject a mechanistic and overly

simplistic view of the world and adopt a more organic approach to policy and strategy. Like gardeners, they must remain patient, accepting setbacks at times but always keeping the whole in mind, even when focused on the individual problems. Islamism has been growing and working its way into Muslim societies for a hundred years; Liberal nations will not easily uproot or eradicate Islamist ideology. A pragmatic approach to the conflict in worldviews that does not abandon liberal principle, but shapes what the environment offers will yield the truest result.



Notes

¹ Niebuhr, xxvii. Foreword to the 1960 edition of *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defense*.

² The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Islamic modernism—the reform of Islamic tradition through emphasis on the *Quran* and Sunnah to meet the needs of modern society, including its institutions and technology—arose in the nineteenth century. Its goal was to restore the strength, dynamism, and flexibility of Muslim societies. A selective approach to borrowing from Western developments was used to prevent Western culture from replacing Islamic culture.

³ Lodhi. Islamic Calvinism, while controversial is a label given to a new form of Turkish Islam that is pro-business and pro-free market. “Critics say it’s a Western conspiracy to Christianise Islam, but others have passionately argued in its favour, holding it up as a model for how Islam and modernity can co-exist.”

⁴ Mozaffari, 17.

⁵ Mozaffari, 19.

⁶ Mozaffari, 19. *Islamiyyûn* is used only in this form (plural masculine) and therefore with a significantly limited and restricted use.

⁷ Mozaffari, 18.

⁸ Mozaffari, 20. “The Sudanese Hasan al-Turabi (b. 1932) is one of them. When he discusses different fractions among Muslims in his book *Al-Islam wal Hukm* [Islam and Government], he uses *Islamiyyûn* to designate ‘political Muslims for whom Islam is the solution, Islam is religion and government and Islam is the Constitution and the law’. Some (Muslim) lay authors increasingly use *Islamiyyûn*, as for example the Tunisian Salwa al-Sharafi, author of *Al-Islamiyyûn wal-Dimuqrâtiyya* [Islamists and Democracy]. We find a thorough analysis of Islamism in Larbi Sadiki’s book *The Search for Arab Democracy*, where he presents a critical analysis on Islamist discourse and ideas, although not as an independent study, but as an appendix to the main issue of his book (democracy). The problem is that Sadiki, like western authors, deals with the terms ‘Islamism’ and ‘Islamists’ without providing a clear definition of these concepts.”

⁹ Mozaffari, 18.

¹⁰ Mozaffari, 18.

¹¹ Mozaffari, 18.

¹² Mozaffari, 21.

¹³ Ferdinando. The United States fails to identify Islamism as a totalitarian ideology and existential threat because it prefers to focus on nation-state actors and a generic threat labeled as terrorism. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter outlines current challenges facing the Defense Department with the helpful acronym CRIKT, standing for China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and terrorism.

¹⁴ Mozaffari, 21.

¹⁵ Ali, 13.

¹⁶ Mozaffari, 30.

¹⁷ Schlesinger Jr., Schlesinger writes- “The great advantage of the American,” Tocqueville wrote over a century ago, “is that he has arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution and that he is born free without having to become so.” With freedom, thus a matter of birthright and not of conquest, the American assumes liberalism as one of the presuppositions of life. With no social revolution in his past, the American has no sense of the role of catastrophe in social change.

¹⁸ Adams, 42.

¹⁹ Rauchway. Eric Rauchway argues in the New Republic that Liberalism and Progressivism are related in the American consciousness.

²⁰ Lippmann, XIX. Lippmann also includes the New Socialism of the syndicalists (a revolutionary doctrine by which workers seize control of the economy and the government by direct means (as a general strike)). Arthur Schlesinger also identifies FDR’s New Deal, which Lippmann does not. See Schlesinger’s *Liberalism in America: A Note for Europeans*.

²¹ Schlesinger.

²² O’Brien, 25-28.

²³ Kant, Immanuel. 1991. *Kant: Political Writings*. Ed. Hans Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. As quoted by O'Brien, 28.

²⁴ Preville.

²⁵ O'Brien, 17. "As intimated, many if not most political actors' stances do not square neatly with the theories of liberalism, nationalism, or postmodernism. Most people's beliefs are indeterminate, inconsistent, and mutable (Carstensen 2011; Geuss 2008: 2–6). Typically, we encounter but fragments of the theories, and often fragments from two or more theories employed by a single actor or articulated in a single policy. It might irk some readers with a proclivity for consistency when I associate, say, Nicolas Sarkozy with a liberal position on one page and a nationalist one on another page. Inconsistent or not, the truth is that the former French president, like scores of other political actors, espouses normatively inconsistent or slippery positions."

242. "If the analysis presented here convinces readers of anything, it ought to be of the messy—that is, polymorphous, multilayered, incoherent, and contradictory—policies concerning Muslims across issues and across Europe."

²⁶ Preville.

²⁷ O'Brien, 28.

²⁸ O'Brien, 28.

²⁹ O'Brien, 28.

³⁰ O'Brien, 34.

³¹ O'Brien, 34.

³² Delanty, Gerard. 2009. *Cosmopolitan Imagination: The Renewal of Social Critical Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. As referenced by O'Brien, 34.

³³ O'Brien, 35.

³⁴ O'Brien, 35.

³⁵ Habermas, Jürgen. 2008. "Notes on Post-secular Society." *New Perspectives Quarterly* 25 (4): 17–29. AS quoted by O'Brien, 36.

³⁶ McParland. For example, Kelly McParland, Editor at the National Post, a Canadian newspaper, documents the confusion Canadian progressives have with how best to support President Obama against ISIS and remain true to their ideals.

³⁷ Hamid, 6.

³⁸ Hamid, 6.

³⁹ Hamid, 5.

⁴⁰ Hamid, 5.

⁴¹ Hamid, 5.

⁴² Sedgwick, 132. For example, Sedgwick writes, "The Islam revived during this period was for the most part post-Salafi Islam, called by some neo-Salafism, which I prefer to label "reformed Islam."

Mehdi. Mehdi Hasan, a presenter on AL Jazeera English writes, "The truth is that Islam has already had its own reformation of sorts, in the sense of a stripping of cultural accretions and a process of supposed "purification". And it didn't produce a tolerant, pluralistic, multifait h utopia, a Scandinavia-on-the-Euphrates. Instead, it produced ... the kingdom of Saudi Arabia."

⁴³ Alexandria; Amman.

⁴⁴ Kagan, 17.

⁴⁵ McCants; Olidort. "The human toll of the crisis in Syria (which activist and quietist Salafis depict as a result of the Assad government's Shiite faith) has led some non-violent Salafis—such as the Lebanese Salafi Ahmed al-Assir—to take up arms and lead battalions in Syria."

⁴⁶ McCants; Olidort. "The humanitarian crisis also continues to inform the quietists' deliberations over how best to protect the welfare and survival of their Muslim brethren. For example, in Kuwait, Salafi fundraisers debate whether money should be channeled towards arming fighters or providing bread and blankets to orphans."

⁴⁷ Kagan, 17.

⁴⁸ Sageman, 7.

⁴⁹ Sageman, 7.

⁵⁰ Kagan, 17.

⁵¹ Hamid, 128.

⁵² Keller.

⁵³ Kagan. Kagan points to the US Treasury report that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, for example, helped establish a Salafi party in Yemen in 2012 for the purpose of establishing another recruiting pool. See Office

of Foreign Asset Control, "Treasury Designates al-Qa'ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen," U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 18, 2013, <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2249.aspx>.

⁵⁴ Kagan, 18.

⁵⁵ Kagan, 18.

⁵⁶ Habeck.

⁵⁷ Al-Banna as quoted by Habeck.

⁵⁸ Miller. The Sykes–Picot Agreement was secretly signed between United Kingdom and France (with the agreement of Russia) during World War I. It "divided the Ottoman Empire into spheres of imperial control, and is often held responsible for establishing the current borders of the Middle East." "IS's English-language propaganda outlet, the Al-Hayat Media Center, released a video called The End Of Sykes-Picot, which showed the destruction of the border between Iraq and Syria. An IS fighter provided a video tour, in clear English, of the border crossing that Iraqi soldiers had abandoned. The "so-called border," according to the IS fighter, was established by Arab leaders and Western imperialists. There is no border, he said, the world belongs to Allah, 'we are all one country,' and IS-held territory should not be divided. He quoted IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as saying he was 'the breaker of barriers.'"

⁵⁹ Hamid, 237.

⁶⁰ Pearcey, Nancy. n.d. "Total Truth Study Guide." Accessed 09 27, 2016. <http://www.pearceyreport.com/TotalTruthStudyGuide.pdf>. Dr. Pearcey is the Scholar-in-Residence and professor at Houston Baptist University. She proposes that because these systems of thought, ideologies or worldviews, are structurally the same, they can be categorized using a system of Creation, Fall, and Redemption.

⁶¹ Abul 'Ala al-Mawdudi, *Islam Today* in the chapter "The Real Cause of Success" Mozaffari, Mehdi. 2007. "What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept." *Totalitarian Movements And Political Religions* 8 (1). Accessed 09 27, 2016.

⁶² Mozaffari, Mehdi. 2007. "What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept." 23.

⁶³ Mozaffari, 23.

⁶⁴ Ali, Ameer. 2000. "Islamism: Emancipation, Protest and Identity." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 20 (1). Accessed 09 27, 2016. <http://web.b.ebscohost.com.aufric.idm.oclc.org/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=232596b4-d2c1-4633-96c6-1983309e8c16%40sessionmgr101&vid=1&hid=102>. 23.

⁶⁵ Ali, 23.

⁶⁶ Ali, 23.

⁶⁷ Ali, 23.

⁶⁸ Wood, Graeme. 2015. "What ISIS Really Wants?" *The Atlantic*. Accessed 10 10, 2016. <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/>.

⁶⁹ Wood.

⁷⁰ Wood.

⁷¹ McGraw.

⁷² McGraw.

⁷³ Locke.

⁷⁴ Remus.

⁷⁵ Remus. "For even if he [Locke] is wrong about the subjection of Catholics to a foreign prince, since the pope's authority as head of Vatican City (and formerly the Papal States) is accidental to his authority as pope, it is still true that when the pope excommunicates a political ruler and absolves that ruler's subjects of the duty of allegiance toward him, he has become involved in a nation's political affairs precisely in virtue of his universal solicitude for the salvation of souls, that is, precisely in virtue of his office as pope."

⁷⁶ NSC 68, Section IV.A

⁷⁷ NSC 68, Section IV.A

⁷⁸ Manent, 36-37.

⁷⁹ Badger.

⁸⁰ Sachs.

⁸¹ Badger.

⁸² Examples of group identity might be people groups based upon religion, ethnicity or culture.

⁸³ Daly. "The trend toward globalization (free trade, free capital mobility) is not usually associated with migration or demography. If globalization were to be accomplished by free mobility of people, then demographers would certainly be paying attention. However, since globalization is being driven primarily by "free migration" of goods and capital, with labor a distant third in terms of mobility, few have noticed that the economic consequences

of this free flow of goods and capital are equivalent to those that would obtain under a free flow of labor.” Obviously, with the increase in migration, and as stated by the guest lecturer from Harvard, borders no longer impose impediments to the transfer of labor to any part of the world.

⁸⁴ Daly.

⁸⁵ Chomsky. Chomsky’s full quote reads: “See, capitalism is not inherently racist- it can exploit racism for its purposes, but racism isn’t built into it. Capitalism basically wants people to be interchangeable cogs, and differences among them, such as on the basis of race, usually are not functional. I mean, they may be functional for a period, like if you want a super-exploited workforce or something, but those situations are kind of anomalous. Over the long term, you can expect capitalism to be anti-racist- just because it’s anti-human. And race is in fact a human characteristic- there’s no reason why it should be a negative characteristic, but it is a human characteristic. So therefore identifications based on race interfere with the basic ideal that people should be available just as consumers and producers, interchangeable cogs who will purchase all the junk that’s produced- that’s their ultimate freedom, and any other properties they might have are kind of irrelevant, and usually a nuisance.”

⁸⁶ Krastev.

⁸⁷ UN Migration Report 2015

⁸⁸ Hoffman, 108.

⁸⁹ UN Migration Report 2015

⁹⁰ UN Migration Report 2015. “In 2014, the total number of refugees in the world was estimated at 19.5 million. Turkey became the largest refugee-hosting country worldwide, with 1.6 million refugees, followed by Pakistan (1.5 million), Lebanon (1.2 million), and the Islamic Republic of Iran (1.0 million). More than half (53 per cent) of all refugees worldwide came from just three countries: the Syrian Arab Republic (3.9 million), Afghanistan (2.6 million), and Somalia (1.1 million).”

⁹¹ Buyon.

⁹² Orban.

⁹³ Kraslev.

⁹⁴ Kraslev.

⁹⁵ Kraslev.

⁹⁶ Juhász, 13. Take for example Hungary who in 2015 during the migration crisis had the most asylum seekers per capita of any European country at 1761 per 100,000 people. “That Hungary is not a ‘destination country’ is also well-illustrated by additional data. With respect to legal immigration, in 2015 there were no significant developments compared to previous years. Less than 200,000 people resided in Hungary with permission from the Immigration Authority; 3,000 have refugee status. In other words, neither number indicates a major shift compared to the previous years.” “Based on the latest census, aside from foreign citizens and accounting for all those who have acquired Hungarian citizenship in the meantime, there were 392,000 foreign-born persons settled in Hungary for more than three months in 2011, and this number has not significantly increased since. It is also important to note that this group includes many people who arrived before 1989 and ethnic Hungarians arriving from across the borders.” While the number of initial asylum seekers might be high, 98% of cases are dropped because the asylum seeker has moved on to another country. Moreover, Hungary’s rejection rate of asylum seekers is around 2%. That means that less than .5% of asylum seekers in Hungary actually make it through the process.

Amnesty International reports that, “Before the closure of the Western Balkans route in March, 99,187 refugees and migrants entered Slovenia; the vast majority of them passed through on their way to Austria. 1,308 people – most of them Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi nationals – applied for asylum.” Eventually, “Slovenia received 124 asylum-seekers relocated from Greece and Italy under the EU relocation scheme by the end of the year, out of a total of 567 asylum-seekers it had committed to accept by the end of 2017.”

For the Czech Republic, Amnesty International reports that, “The government agreed to continue with resettlement and the EU-sanctioned relocation scheme but with in-depth security checks. Only 52 refugees were resettled and 12 were relocated to the country by the end of the year.”

⁹⁷ Juhász, 38.

⁹⁸ Bajekal.

⁹⁹ Livingstone.

¹⁰⁰ O’Brien, 206; 212-213

¹⁰¹ O’Brien, 206.

¹⁰² Laurence, 7. “Today, national interior ministries across Europe help oversee and coordinate the routinization and banalization of Islamic religious practices in Europe (what one French Muslim leader has called “the right to indifference,” in opposition to “the right to be different”): the financing and construction of mosques; the civic integration of imams; the appointment of Muslim chaplains in prisons, the army, and hospitals; the design

of religious curriculum in publicly funded schools; and the celebration of major holidays and religious events—from lamb slaughter for Eid al-Adha to the pilgrimage to Mecca.”

¹⁰³ Laurence, 12.

¹⁰⁴ O’Brien, 206.

¹⁰⁵ Dearden.

¹⁰⁶ O’Brien, 207.

¹⁰⁷ O’Brien, 207.

¹⁰⁸ Roy, Olivier. 2007. *Secularism Confronts Islam*. Trans. George Holoch. New York: Columbia University Press. As quoted by O’Brien, 207.

¹⁰⁹ Chotiner.

¹¹⁰ Chotiner.

¹¹¹ Chotiner.

¹¹² Laurence, 6.

¹¹³ Laurence, 12.

¹¹⁴ O’Brien, 212.

¹¹⁵ Bossong, 114.

¹¹⁶ Bossong, 114. O’Brien, 213.

¹¹⁷ Crisis Group, 14. Quotation taken from *Welt am Sonntag*, 28 May 2006.

¹¹⁸ Laurence, 12.

¹¹⁹ Wright.

¹²⁰ Laurence, 11.

¹²¹ Tibi, 31.

¹²² Wedgeworth and Escalante. The authors make the argument that an oath of loyalty would be Locke’s solution to the general problem of those who do not or cannot share the religious and political assumptions of his argument. I have extended that argument to apply to the specific category of Muslims who do not share the religious and political assumptions of Locke.

¹²³ O’Brien, 213. O’Brien is consolidating a thought from Diane Sainsbury’s book *Welfare States and Immigrant Rights*. Sainsbury, Diane. 2012. *Welfare States and Immigrant Rights: The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 111.

¹²⁴ Hackett.

¹²⁵ Manent, 100.

¹²⁶ Manent, 109.

¹²⁷ Manent, 101.

¹²⁸ Manent, 109.

¹²⁹ Manent, 109.

¹³⁰ Manent, 48-49.

¹³¹ Manent, 49 “The burqa is inadmissible, not only or mainly because it affects women exclusively and thus constitutes an inequality, but first of all because it prevents the exchange of signs by which a human being recognizes another human being. It is by the face that each of us reveals himself or herself as a human being and as this particular human being. . . . To present visibly one’s refusal to be seen is an ongoing aggression against human coexistence.”

¹³² Pierre Manent as quoted by David Frum in his article “*What Would It Mean for France to Accommodate Muslims?*”

¹³³ Weigel. 133-134.

¹³⁴ Weigel. 133-134.

¹³⁵ Weigel. 133-134.

¹³⁶ Weigel. 134.

¹³⁷ Bell, 15.

¹³⁸ Bell, 63.

¹³⁹ Bell, 63.

¹⁴⁰ Roser.

¹⁴¹ Bell 315.

¹⁴² Bell, 315.

¹⁴³ Sass.

¹⁴⁴ Bell, 315. Borrowing a line of thinking from Carl Schmitt, David Bell notes “that the hope for lasting peace can itself fatally tempt societies to engage in one, final great paroxysm of violence.”

¹⁴⁵ Bell, 310.

¹⁴⁶ Bell, 310. "Indeed, during the century that followed Waterloo, this vision grew in inebriating power, thanks to such writers as reactionary Joseph de Maistre, who has already written about the "purifying" powers of war in the late 1790s."

¹⁴⁷ Bell, 311.

¹⁴⁸ Bell, 311.

¹⁴⁹ Bush.

¹⁵⁰ Bush. Froomkin. The Kudlow interview with Bush has some of Bush's words unintelligible and quotes President Bush as saying, "You know, it's been one a the--war is terrible, but war brings out, you know, in some ways, it touches the core of Americans who volunteer to go in to combat to protect their--so it touches something unique, I think about our country." While Dan Froomkin's blog at the Washington Post states that Bush said, "War is terrible. But it, war brings out, you know, in some ways it it it touches the core of Americans who volunteer to go in to combat to protect their, their souls." I have edited Froomkin's quotation to remove the repetition of the word "it" to make the quote more understandable.

¹⁵¹ Niebuhr, *Children of Light*, 187.

¹⁵² Stanley and Lee.

¹⁵³ Kagan, 7.

¹⁵⁴ Niebuhr, *Children of Light*, 189.

¹⁵⁵ Niebuhr, *Children of Light*, 189. Ultimately, the answer for Niebuhr is the hope found in the Christian faith. "The hope of Christian faith that the divine power which bears history can complete what even the highest human striving must leave incomplete, and can purify the corruptions which appear in even the purest human aspirations, is an indispensable prerequisite for diligent fulfillment of our historic tasks." In addition, 189-190. "The world community, toward which all historical forces seem to be driving us, is mankind's final possibility and impossibility. The task of achieving it must be interpreted from the standpoint of a faith which understands the fragmentary and broken character of all historical achievements and yet has confidence in their meaning because it knows their completion to be in the hands of a Divine Power, whose resources are greater than those of men, and whose suffering live can overcome the corruptions of man's achievements, without negating the significance of our striving."

¹⁵⁶ Niebuhr, *Children of Light*, 186.

¹⁵⁷ Gaddis.

¹⁵⁸ Gaddis.

¹⁵⁹ Gaddis.

¹⁶⁰ Gaddis.

¹⁶¹ Gaddis.

¹⁶² Gaddis.

¹⁶³ Gaddis.

¹⁶⁴ Gaddis.

¹⁶⁵ Gaddis.

¹⁶⁶ Fouad Ajami, "The Moor's Last Laugh," *Wall Street Journal*, March 22, 2004 as quoted in George Weigel, *The Cube and the Cathedral*. 134.

¹⁶⁷ Gaddis.

¹⁶⁸ Hamid, 90.

¹⁶⁹ Hamid, 90.

¹⁷⁰ Niebuhr, *Children of Light*, 187-188.

¹⁷¹ O'Brien, 36. O'Brien is using a thought from Thomas Spragens 1981 work, *The Irony of Liberal Reason*; Wherein Spragens calls this contrast between the voluntarist and perfectionist perspectives the "irony of liberal reason."

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